En este ar tícu lo el au tor in ten ta eva luar el li bro más re cien te de Wil frid J. Wa lu chow, al ca rac te ri zar su ob je ti vo prin ci pal, a sa ber: pro por cio nar una me jor ex pli ca ción del con trol ju di cial de la cons ti tu cio na li dad en una de mo cra cia cons ti tu cio nal me dian te la me tá fo ra del "ár bol vi vien te"; al cues tio nar un ar gu men to, pre ci sa men te el que re du ce di cha me tá fo ra a la me to do lo gía (de aba jo ha cia arri ba) del com mon law; y, al re-de sa rrollar una al ter na ti va, es pe cí fi ca men te al iden ti fi car la mo ra li dad po lí ti ca cons ti tu cio nal de la co mu ni dad, a par tir de una en mien da ami ga ble, mis ma que ya está ex plí ci ta -o has ta cier to pun to im plí ci ta-en ella, i. e. no sólo por los juz ga do res sino tam bién por los le gis la do res, in clui dos los cons ti tu yen tes ori gi na rios y re vi so res o re for ma do res, y otros ope rado res ju rí di cos, in clui dos abo ga dos y ciu da da nos, lo cual al fi nal de cuen tas le dará el pun to. 
Abstract:
In this ar ti cle the au thor aims to as sess Wilfrid J. Waluchow's more re cent book, by de pict ing its main aim, namely to pro vide a better un der stand ing of ju di cial re view in a con sti tu tional de moc racy via the "liv ing tree" met aphor; by dis ap prov ing an un war ranted claim, pur posely to re duce the met a phor to the com mon law (bot tom-up) 
meth od ol ogy; and by re-de vel oping his al ter na tive, spe cif i cally to iden tify the com mu nity's con sti tu tional po lit i cal mo ral ity, with a friendly amend ment, which is al ready ex plicit -or at least some how im plicit-on it, i.e. not only by judges but also by leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, and other le gal of ficials, in clud ing law yers and cit i zens, which at the end will grant him the point.

I. INTRODUCTION
Tak ing the Con sti tu tion and the Char ter Rights se ri ously is one of the aims of Wilfrid J. Waluchow's A Com mon Law The ory of Ju di cial Re view. The Liv ing Tree and tak ing the claims of this book se ri ously is one of the am bi tions of mine for this roundtable and here in af ter, as Jules Verne might put it "around the world for eight days". 1 Anal o gously, I will in tend: in the com ing first two sections, to praise dif fer ent as pects of his jour ney/voy age, although I may from time to time get him into trou ble; in the third, to ap praise what I con sider to be an un nec es sary devi a tion that might de railed him from his con quest/prize; and, in the last two, to raise his orig i nal route with what I con sider to be a better trail to get him back railed on the right track. In other words, I pre tend: (1) to de pict his main aim, i.e. to pro vide a better un der stand ing of ju di cial re view in a con sti tu tional de moc racy via the "liv ing tree" met aphor; (2) to dis ap prove of an un war ranted claim, i.e. to reduce the "liv ing tree met a phor" to the com mon law (bottom-up) meth od ol ogy; and (3) to re-de velop his al ter na tive, i. e. to iden tify the com mu nity's con sti tu tional po lit i cal moral ity, with a friendly amend ment, which is al ready ex plicit -or at least some how im plicit-on it, i. e. not only by judges but also by leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, and other le gal of fi cials, including lawyers and citizens, which at the end will grant him a victory/win.
II. THE LIVING TREE METAPHOR
I ap plaud the "liv ing tree" met a phor as draw ing the picture of a "liv ing con sti tu tion" be yond the given por trait of a 288 IMER B. FLORES (México) but also in Cam bridge (United King dom) dur ing the "H. L. A. Hart Con ference" and in Krakow (Po land) dur ing the XXIII IVR World Con gress Law and Le gal Cul tures in the 21st Cen tury: Di ver sity and Unity, in gen eral, and in a Spe cial Workshop "Charters, Con sti tu tions and De moc racy" or ga nized to as sess and dis cuss Waluchow's book, in par tic u lar. How ever, the con no ta tion draws a fur ther akin re la tion ship be tween the as sis tance pro vided by one of the char ac ters (af fa ble and em pa thetic) to an other and the as sess ment of fered by a com men ta tor (ami able and sym pa thetic) to an author.
"dy namic con sti tu tion". 2 A dis tinc tion is help ful: al though, liv ing be ings or things and non-liv ing be ings or things can be dy namic, the lat ter are much more lim ited than the former. For in stance, a func tion ing ma chine can be set in motion and stopped, i.e. turn on and turn off, by some one or some thing, in more or less ex pected and fore seen ways, whereas an or gan ism has a life of its own and hence is capa ble of (re)act ing in dif fer ent and at some point un expected and un fore seen ways. 3 To sum up the idea and its 289 THE LIVING TREE 2 Al though there are dif fer ent ap proaches to con sti tu tional in ter pre ta tion and not all ac cept the idea of the "liv ing con sti tu tion" -such as lit er al ism and originalism-its dy namic fea ture has in creas ingly gained ac cep tance. How ever, the al le gory of a "dy namic con sti tu tion" is very lim ited. Hence, I pre fer -de spite the on go ing crit i cism mainly from the originalists-the "liv ing con sti tu tion" as portrayed in the "liv ing tree" anal ogy. Vid. Beard, Charles A., "The Liv ing Con sti tution", 3 Else where I have pointed out the in trin sic lim i ta tions of think ing of law -and for that pur pose the con sti tu tion and its re con sti tu tion via con sti tu tional reenactments and amend ments or re forms-in merely me chanic-phys i cal terms. If… one views a cons ti tu tion as a "li ving tree" that grows and adapt to con tem po rary cir cums tan ces, trends, and be liefs and who se cu rrent and con ti nued aut ho rity rests on its justi ce or on fac tors like the con sent, com mit ment, or so vereignty of the peo ple-now, not the fra mers or the people-then, then one will be far less li kely to find such ap peals (i.e. the appeal to fi xity, not fle xi bi lity) con clu si ve, or even par ti cu larly re le vant.
In short, it is "a tree that is very much alive" (p. 69) -and I might add-"and kick ing" to fol low Balkin's idea. A "liv ing thing" ca pa ble of "or ganic growth" (p. 183, fn 6): a tree which has roots al ready fixed and sta ble (or en trenched and writ ten), as well as flex i ble and adapt able branches to be con tin u ously fixed and re-fixed (or to be en trenched and writ ten, and -if you want-to be re-en trenched and re-written).
Let me ad vance that the "liv ing tree" met a phor, as such, was in tro duced in Ed wards v. At tor ney Gen eral of Can ada (also known as the "Per sons Case"), which was de cided in 1930 by the Privy Coun cil of the United King dom and recog nized for Ca na di ans in Ca na dian Law most of the rights in cluded now in the Char ter long be fore its in tro duc tion in 1982 (By the way, let me con grat u late the Ca na di ans for the first 25 years of their liv ing Con sti tu tion; and, let me ad vance that at some other point in time, I pre tend to develop from this fact an ar gu ment against Waluchow's inclusive legal positivism account.)
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how an or ganic-bi o log i cal al ter na tive is much more prom is ing. Cfr. Hayek, Friedrich A. von, The Con sti tu tion of Lib erty, Chi cago, The Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 1960, p. 70: "Our at ti tude ought to be sim i lar to that of the phy si cian to ward a liv ing or gan ism: like him, we have to deal with a self-main tain ing whole which is kept go ing by forces which we can not re place and which we must there fore use in all we try to achieve. What can be done to im prove it must be done by work ing with these forces rather than against them. In all our en deavor at im prove ment we must al ways work in side this given whole, aim at piece meal, rather than to tal, con struction, and use at each stage the his tor i cal ma te rial at hand and im prove de tails step by step rather than at tempt to re de sign the whole".
How ever, the no tion of the "liv ing con sti tu tion" as a "living tree" can be traced back to Chief Jus tice John Mar shall, who, in McCulloch v. Mary land (1819), re call the na ture of the Con sti tu tion and its in ter pre ta tion: "[W]e must never for get that it is a con sti tu tion we are ex pound ing… [a consti tu tion does not] par take of the pro lix ity of a le gal code… a con sti tu tion, in tended to en dure for ages to come, and, con se quently, to be adapted to the var i ous cri ses of hu man af fairs". And, one cen tury af ter, Jus tice Ol i ver Wendell Holmes Jr., in his dis sent in Abrams v. United States (1919), rec ol lected: "[O]ur Con sti tu tion… is an ex per i ment, as all life is an ex per i ment". 4 And, one year later, in Mis souri v. Hol land (1920), remembered:
When we are deal ing with words that are also a constitutent act, like the Con sti tu tion of the United States, we must re alize that they have called into life a be ing the de vel op ment of which could not have been fore seen com pletely by the most gifted of its be get ters. It was enough for them to re al ize or to hope that they had cre ated an or gan ism; it has taken a century and has cost their suc ces sors much sweat and blood to prove that they cre ated a na tion. The case be fore us must be con sid ered in the light of our whole ex pe ri ence and not merely of what was said a hun dred years ago.
Like wise, in those same years, Jus tice Louis D. Brandeis re mem bered: "Our Con sti tu tion is not a straight jacket. It is a liv ing or gan ism. As such, it is ca pa ble of growth or ex pansion and ad ap ta tion to new con di tions. Growth im plies changes, po lit i cal, eco nomic and so cial". 5 The law of our day fa ces a two fold need. The first is the need of some res ta te ment that will bring cer tainty and or der out of the wil der ness of pre ce dent. This is the task of le gal science. The se cond is the need of a phi lo sophy that will me dia te bet ween the con flic ting claims of sta bi lity and pro gress, and supply a prin ci ple of growth.
III. TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW: THE DEBATE I ad mire the way the de bate was framed and re-framed by Waluchow not only by in tro duc ing help ful dis tinc tions but also by pre sent ing the de bate itself.
On the one hand, I am cer tain that the book con tains an alyt i cal and crit i cal dis tinc tions, which are quite help ful to un der stand the im por tance of the de bate: Rex/Re gina, sover eign/gov ern ment, lim ited/un lim ited, con sti tu tional law/ con sti tu tional con ven tion, pro ce dural con cep tion of de mocracy/con sti tu tional con cep tion of de moc racy, Regas/De mos, Her cu les/Ulys ses -re-la beled here as Atticus (on be half of Atticus Finch, the char ac ter of the fic tional novel To Kill the Mock ing bird, a law yer, bru tally hon est, highly moral, and a tire less cru sader for good causes -even hope less ones), 7 expressed wishes/best in ter ests, au then tic-gen u ine wishes/ unauthentic-not gen u ine ones, "top-down"/"bot tom-up" methodologies, peo ple-then/peo ple-now, and so on.
On the other hand, I am con fi dent that the book in cludes an ex ten sive and ex haus tive anal y sis and crit i cism of all the ar gu ments, claims, ex am ples, and ob jec tions, em bedded in the stan dard case for Ju di cial Re view as well of all coun ter-ar gu ments, claims, ex am ples, and ob jec tions, implanted in the crit ics' case against it, in clud ing their "Ar gument from De moc racy". In fact, it is hard to imag ine, even one sin gle ar gu ment, claim, ex am ple, or ob jec tion and their cor re spond ing coun ter-ar gu ment, claim, ex am ple, or ob jection, made by both the ad vo cates and the crit ics of writ ten en trenched Charters and Ju di cial Re view, such as Ron ald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron, respectively, or any other authors known, left out.
Let me point out that af ter a bril liant ex po si tion of both the stan dard case and the crit ics case, Waluchow starts a no less bril liant ex plo ra tion of the pos si ble routes for an ongo ing de bate. In stead of talk ing past each other as no threat or thwart has been im posed unto the road, he decided cou ra geously, rather than tak ing a long de tour or a short-cut tak ing him no where, to face the dan gers and obstruc tions blocking the road ahead.
Faced with the op tion of aban don ing en trenched writ ten Charters and Ju di cial Re view al to gether as Waldron advised -or at least par tially as Tom Camp bell ad vo cated, by adopt ing a leg is la tive Bill of Rights to be en forced not by courts but by leg is la tures-8 Waluchow de vel oped an al terna tive to it, which con sti tutes a better un der stand ing of the role of Charters Rights and Ju di cial Re view in a Constitutional Democracy.
IV. WALUCHOW'S ALTERNATIVE: A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
I agree with al most ev ery thing Waluchow says, in the six chap ters of the book, in clud ing the con clu sions but I have a small prob lem with one of the pre mises (some one might 293 THE LIVING TREE even think that it is a con clu sion in it self). My feel ing is that this prem ise (or con clu sion) is un nec es sary for the main ob jec tive. I re fer mainly to the fifth chap ter or at least to some thing within its core. It is not truly a small, but a big problem.
My hunch is that through out the book Waluchow has been for mu lat ing pow er ful ar gu ments not only for a better un der stand ing of Charters Rights and Ju di cial Re view in a Rep re sen ta tive De moc racy (or for those hav ing a Pro ce dural Con cep tion of De moc racy) but also for lim ited gov ern ment in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy (or for those hold ing a Consti tu tional Con cep tion of De moc racy), where both leg is lation and ad ju di ca tion, leg is la tures and courts, leg is la tors and judges, are com pat i ble with their re spec tive lim its and pow ers not merely func tion ing but co ex ist ing in a di vi sion of labor as complementary and not merely by controlling each other.
In ad di tion, even more pre cisely, the prob lem is with circum scrib ing the al ter na tive to the Com mon Law meth od ology, which is char ac ter ize as a bot tom-up one to meet the chal lenge that dis agree ment co mes all the way down: suggest ing that it is pos si ble to re vise Char ter Rights by Ju di cial Re view at the point of their ap pli ca tion. The ap proach ech oes H. L. A. Hart's to-the-cen ter moves, which re sem bles Ar istotle's mid dle term. Let me re phrase it: Com mon Law reason ing is re vis able at the point of ap pli ca tion, whereas Statu tory Law is not. Char ter Rights, which re sem ble fixed Stat u tory Law in the sense that they are en trenched and writ ten, re quire a flex i ble ap pli ca tion sim i lar to the one of Com mon Law. Hence, the Com mon Law meth od ol ogy appears to be the way out. Ac tu ally, as I said, it seems the way up to face dis agree ment all the way down.
My gut feel ing is that this is not the case. It might be the case for an un-en trenched un writ ten Char ter con structed all the way up by judges alone as judge made-law, but not to an en trenched writ ten one, in which leg is la tors, in cluding fram ers, amenders or re form ers have a say: they have al ready said some thing and are en ti tled to say some thing else. Keep 
How ever, it is clear that the dif fer ences be tween the Common Law and the Civil Law sys tems and their re spec tive meth od ol o gies tend to be ex ag ger ated, over drawn and overstated, whilst both sys tems are get ting closer and re sem ble each other more ev ery day. Ac tu ally, it might be ar gued that the for mer is more flex i ble than fixed, while the later is more fixed than flex i ble. But both, in deal ing with pre cedents, have found a bal ance be tween these two com pet ing needs for fix ity and flex i bil ity. Hence, it is pos si ble to be think ing of a shared meth od ol ogy and a much more sim i lar way of rea son ing all across the board. It is, cer tainly, "some thing like" the Com mon Law, but not the Com mon Law per se.
For the pur pose of iden ti fy ing the puz zling Com mon Law fea tures, Waluchow quotes a sum mary made by Fred er ick Schauer in his book re view of The Na ture of the Com mon Law of Melvin Aron Eisenberg. 9 In short, the rules of the Com mon Law: (1a) are no where canonically for mu lated or there is no sin gle au thor i ta tive for mu la tion; (2a) are not made by leg is la tures, but by courts; (3a) are cre ated by courts in the very pro cess of ap pli ca tion (and ap plied ret roac tively to facts aris ing prior to the es tab lish ment of the 295 THE LIVING TREE rule); and (4a) are not only cre ated in ter sti tially but also mod i fied or re placed when its ap pli ca tion would gen er ate a ma lig nant re sult in the case at hand. 10 To the con trary, Char ter Rights: (1b) are ev ery where formu lated, al though with open tex ture and vague terms that cer tainly do not pro vide a sin gle (straight for ward) au thor i tative for mu la tion; (2b) are nei ther made by leg is la tures nor by courts, but drafted orig i nally into a au thor i ta tive source such as the Con sti tu tion or in a Bill or Char ter of Rights, as well as in cor po rated to it by means of Con sti tu tional Conven tions and Con sti tu tional Amend ments or Re forms, by its fram ers, amenders or re form ers, and cer tainly re de fined or re made by both leg is la tures and courts, via leg is la tion and its ap pli ca tion-in ter pre ta tion; (3b) are not cre ated out of the blue by courts in the pro cess of ap pli ca tion (and hence not nec es sar ily ap plied ret ro ac tively), but cer tainly re vis able by them at point of ap pli ca tion; and (4b) are nei ther cre ated in ter sti tially nor mod i fied or re placed, when its ap pli ca tion would gen er ate a ma lig nant re sult in the case at hand -or at least no need to be, for example, remember the racial segregation cases in the United States of America.
Fur ther more, the Com mon Law meth od ol ogy as such was not di rected to de let ing or sub tract ing rules from the system but to in sert ing and add ing other rules to it. Jus tice Antonin Scalia stated: "It should be ap par ent that by reason of the doc trine of stare decisis… the com mon law grew in a pe cu liar fash ion -rather like a Scrab ble board. No rule of de ci sion pre vi ously an nounced could be erased, but qual i fi ca tions could be added to it". 11 So far there is no con clu sive ar gu ment for sus tain ing that the Com mon Law meth od ol ogy is the de fin ing one under ly ing Char ter cases. Some how it is true that by lack ing a sin gle (straight for ward) for mu la tion, due to the fact of be ing en acted -and re en acted-with open tex ture and vague terms, Char ter Rights re quire to be con stantly re vised at the point of ap pli ca tion in case-by-case sce nar ios and from time-to-time. Cer tainly, I am not rul ing out that "some thing like" the Com mon Law -or at least the Com mon Law in part or par tially-plays a de fin ing part and a key role here and else where. Keep in mind Eisenberg in tro duc tory remarks: 12 My pur po se here is to de ve lop the ins ti tu tio nal prin ci ples that go vern the way in which the com mon law is es ta blis hed in our so ciety [i. e. a Com mon Law country, such as the United Sta tes of Ame ri ca]. Much of our law de ri ves from ru les laid down in cons ti tu tions, sta tu tes, or ot her aut ho ri ta ti ve texts that the courts must in ter pret but may not re for mu late. The com mon law, in con trast, is the part of the law that is wit hin the pro vin ce of the courts them sel ves to es ta blish. In some areas of law, like torts and con tracts, com mon law rules pre do mi na te. In ot her areas, like cor po ra tions, they are ex tre mely im por tant. In all areas, even tho se that are ba sically cons ti tu tio nal or sta tu tory, they fi gu re at least in ters titially.
Ad di tion ally, I can hardly imag ine Waldron and Dworkin -or some one else for that ef fect-not com ing af ter Waluchow for his move.
On the one hand, Waldron -or any other critic-might hold him ac count able for not tak ing the leg is la tors and legis la tures se ri ously by not ac com mo dat ing them into the the ory. Why in sist on judges and courts as the one and only (fi nal) sole law-mak ers or in ter pret ers of Char ter Rights? What about leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers? It does not suf fice to af firm. "The re sult [of mix ing Hart, Reaume, and Schauer] is our al ter na tive model of Charters and their le git i macy, the com mon law con cep tion, which in no way un der mined by the circumstances of politics" (p. 209).
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On the other hand, Dworkin -or any other ad vo catemight hold him ac count able for ob scur ing what judges and courts do by sug gest ing that it is all the way up flex i ble inter pre ta tion: Is it re ally a bot tom-up meth od ol ogy, all the way up flex i ble in ter pre ta tion, re gard less of the fix ity, i.e. en trenched and writ ten char ac ter, of Charters? I guess not. What's more do ing it, i.e. ad mit ting that it is the Com mon Law bot tom-up meth od ol ogy, will be like say ing that the living tree grows from the branches to wards the roots and that will amount to throw ing the metaphor away with the bath water.
To sum up, my claim is that "The Liv ing Tree" is not merely "A Com mon Law The ory of Ju di cial Re view", since it is much more than that: "A Gen eral The ory of (Ju di cial Review in a) Con sti tu tional De moc racy". On one side, it is a gen eral the ory and meth od ol ogy be yond the bound aries of the Com mon Law sys tem and its bot tom-up meth od ol ogy; and, on the other, it is not lim ited to the role that judges play in Ju di cial Re view, but to their role in a Con sti tu tional De moc racy and its com pat i bil ity with the one played by legis la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders and re form ers, as well as other le gal of fi cials and operators, such as lawyers and citizens.
Waluchow can eas ily an swer to my ob jec tion by say ing that (1) he is in ter ested in de vel op ing a Com mon Law Theory of Ju di cial Re view for Com mon Law coun tries with a Com mon Law meth od ol ogy or sys tem; and (2) he is in terested nei ther in a Gen eral The ory of Ju di cial Re view nor to be ap plied to a Con sti tu tional De moc racy. How ever, I am cer tain that it is the con trary, since he is truly in ter ested in pro vid ing a better un der stand ing of Char ter Rights and Judi cial Re view, i.e. a gen eral de scrip tion-ex pla na tion, to be ap plied all across the board. But why la beled it as a Common Law, bot tom-up meth od ol ogy, when it is nei ther truly so nor need to be the case? It might be "some thing like" the Com mon Law, but not per se. In other word, some thing shared in com mon by all le gal sys tems with writ ten en -trenched Bill or Charters of Rights and Ju di cial Re view. Hence, the quest for an al ter na tive, i.e. an amendment or reform to his alternative, is indispensable.
V. AN AMENDMENT TO WALUCHOW'S ALTERNATIVE:
A GENERAL THEORY OF (JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A) CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY?
My amend ment, fol low ing Waluchow's Hartian move, can also be la beled as oc cu py ing the cen ter-mid dle. My claim is that, in Char ter cases, we start with the in ter pre ta tion of the text, a fixed en trenched and writ ten Char ter of Rights, with open-tex ture and vague terms, some thing like a Stat utory Law, top-down meth od ol ogy; and, then, only then, we con front it -at the point of ap pli ca tion-with "some thing like" a Com mon Law, bot tom-up meth od ol ogy, as Waluchow rightly claims.
Clearly, it is not all the way-down Stat u tory Law ap pli cation by a judge com pletely def er en tial to what ever the leg isla tor, in clud ing the framer, the amender or the re former, said; nor all the way-up Com mon Law re vi sion at the point of ap pli ca tion as judge-made law. It is a dif fer ent meth od ology one that re quires a meet ing point, as the one pro vided by Waluchow him self in chap ter sixth, i. e. find ing the commu nity's con sti tu tional mo ral ity, by us ing "some thing like" John Rawls' "re flec tive equi lib rium" -or even "some thing like" H. L. A. Hart's "crit i cal re flec tive at ti tude". 13 
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One part of which is al ready fixed, as a sort of pre-commit ment, but drafted in open-tex ture and vague terms, by the way flex i ble which re quired to be re-fixed, adapted in case-by-case sce nar ios and from time to time, by courts and judges, but leav ing space for leg is la tures and leg is lators, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, as well as other le gal of fi cials, to play a key role in other stages of the po lit i cal pro cess or as Waldron puts it in the cir cum stances of pol i tics. But this com plex meth od ol ogy is com pat i ble with the one por trayed, by some ad vo cates of the stan dard case for Ju di cial Re view, such as Dworkin's "in teg rity model", in clud ing both fit and moral value or worth, or John Hart Ely's "rep re sen ta tion re in force ment model", incor po rat ing the rep re sen ta tion of mi nor i ties at the same time of bal anc ing both the im pos si bil ity of a (strict) clausebound interpretivism and the ne ces sity of dis cov er ing funda men tal val ues. 14 In my opin ion, the meth od ol ogy re quires to keep a complex bal ance not only be tween fix ity and flex i bil ity but also "There may be nar rower scope for op er a tion of the pre sump tion of con sti tu tional ity when leg is la tion ap pears on its face to be within a spe cific pro hi bi tion of the Consti tu tion, such as those of the first ten amend ments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em braced within the Four teenth...
It is un nec es sary to con sider now whether leg is la tion which re stricts those po lit i cal pro cesses which can or di narily be ex pected to bring about re peal of un desir able leg is la tion, is to be sub jected to more ex act ing ju di cial scru tiny un der the gen eral pro hi bi tions of the Four teenth Amend ment than are most other types of leg is la tion… Nor need we en quire whether sim i lar con sid er ations en ter into the re view of statutes di rected at par tic u lar re li gious ... or na tional ... or ra cial mi nor i ties ...: whether prej u dice against dis crete and in su lar mi nor i ties may be a spe cial con dition, which tends se ri ously to cur tail the op er a tion of those po lit i cal pro cesses ordi narily to be re lied upon to pro tect mi nor i ties, and which may call for a cor respond ingly more search ing ju di cial in quiry.
be tween fal li bil ity and fi nal ity. In that sense, it is an open pro ce dure that al lows other ac tors, be sides judges, to play their re spec tive roles. It im plies a con stant re vi sion not only at the point of ap pli ca tion but also at any other point in time; and re quires the greater space avail able for de lib er ation and ex per i men ta tion about the ca pac i ties, ne ces si ties and pos si bil i ties for or ganic growth within its lim its. In my opin ion it is a meth od ol ogy, which al lows fal si fy ing some (mis)in ter pre ta tions and (mis)ap pli ca tions, or sim ply mod ify ing or re plac ing them with better in ter pre ta tions and appli ca tions if not by the cor rect and right ones. It is something like the trial-and-er ror pro cess of the nat u ral, Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res ju di cata, uni ver sal inex o ra ble com mand. 'The rule of stare decisis, though one tend ing to con sis tency and uni for mity of de ci sion, is not inflex i ble. Whether it shall be fol lowed or de parted from is a ques tion en tirely within the dis cre tion of the court, which is again called upon to con sider a ques tion once de cided.' Stare decisis is usu ally the wise pol icy, be cause in most mat ters it is more im por tant that the ap pli ca ble rule of law be set tled than that it be set tled right. This is com monly true even where the er ror is a mat ter of se ri ous con cern, pro vided correc tion can be had by leg is la tion. But in cases in volv ing the Fed eral Con sti tu tion, where cor rec tion through leg is la tive ac tion is prac ti cally im pos si ble, this court has of ten overruled its ear lier de ci sions. The court bows to the les sons of ex pe ri ence and the force of better rea son ing, rec og niz ing that the pro cess of trial and er ror, so fruit ful in the phys i cal sciences, is ap pro pri ate also in the ju di cial func tion.
The pro cess of trail-and-er ror de scribes and ex plains how an er ror in leg is la tion is cor rected by ad ju di ca tion and vice versa, i.e. how an er ror in ad ju di ca tion is pre vented by legis la tion. By the by, the for mer does not amount to "ju di cial leg is la tion" nor con sti tutes a "ju di cial usur pa tion", as Lon L. Fuller said: "The cor rec tion of ob vi ous leg is la tive er rors or over sights is not to sup plant the leg is la tive will, but to make that will ef fec tive". 16 In con trast, the lat ter does not amount to "leg is la tive ad ju di ca tion" nor con sti tutes a "leg isla tive usur pa tion", as Fuller might say: "The pre ven tion of ob vi ous adjudicative er rors or over sights is not to supplant the judiciary will, but to make that will effective".
What I have in mind is that other in sti tu tions, with varying forces, must come into play to as sure the con stant and con tin u ous par tic i pa tion not only of judges but also of legis la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers, as well as other le gal of fi cials. (re quir ing the Courts to ad dress the Leg is la tive if it is neces sary to in ter pret the law for a bind ing de ter mi na tion.) 17 In ad di tion, I can point out in the case of Mex ico and its Fed eral Con sti tu tion: 1) ar ti cle 72, sec tion f, which em powers the leg is la tive to is sue, among other things, in ter pre tative de crees; 2) ar ti cle 105, which re quires the vote of 8 justices out of the 11 that con sti tute the Su preme Court at large (or 4 out of the 5 that con sti tute each one of the two benches) to have a gen eral (de rog a tory) ef fect in some cases; and 3) ar ti cle 135, which im poses a 2/3 su pra-major ity of the mem bers pres ent in both cham bers of Congress, dis cuss ing and ap prov ing it con sec u tively (and a sim ple ma jor ity of the leg is la tures of the states) for a constitutional amendment or reform.
VI. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL FORCES AND REQUIREMENTS: JUDGES, LEGISLATORS, OTHER LEGAL OFFICIALS, LAWYERS AND CITIZENS
Let me ad vance that any suc cess ful al ter na tive has not only to cope with fix ity and flex i bil ity but also deal with falli bil ity and fi nal ity. In a Con sti tu tional De moc racy, Ju di cial Re view is nec es sary to check the fal li bil ity of the hu man con di tion, such as the one of leg is la tors, in clud ing fram ers, amenders or re form ers. Why as sume that leg is la tors are infal li ble? In ad di tion, leg is la tors do not have a fi nal say and leg is la tion does not count as fi nal ity. Why sup pose that legis la tors are fi nal? 18 How ever, since judges are not in fal li ble and hence are not en ti tled to the fi nal say, ei ther; it is neces sary to keep the pro cess open, i.e. re vis able in case by case sce nar ios and from time to time, which re in forces the need for an ad e quate bal ance be tween fix ity and flex i bility. 19 In Waluchow's own words: "Charters trans form complex is sues of po lit i cal mo ral ity… into «them-against-us» It is true that there seems to be dis agree ment all the way down, but there might be some agree ment all the way up. Hence, what we need is nei ther a dik tat from one to the other or vice versa, nor a fi nal ar bi ter or ref eree, but a better un der stand ing of the di a lec ti cal and dialogical re lation ship be tween courts and leg is la tures, as well as other le gal of fi cials, in the search for the com mu nity's con sti tutional mo ral ity. For in stance, the dif fer ent in sti tu tional forces and re quire ments that come into play in México to check not only the fal li bil ity and fi nal ity but also the fixity and flexibility include: 1) Leg is la tion has to be passed by an ab so lute ma jor ity, i.e. 50% + 1, of the mem bers pres ent in both cham bers of Con gress, dis cuss ing and ap prov ing it se quen tially (ar ti cle 72), whereas a Con sti tu tional Amend ment or Re form has to be passed -as we al ready in di cated-by a 2/3 su pra-major ity, i. e. 66.66%, of the mem bers pres ent in both chambers of Con gress, dis cuss ing and ap prov ing it suc ces sively (and the ab so lute ma jor ity, i. e. 50% + 1, of the leg is la tures of the states) (ar ti cle 135). 20 2) Leg is la tion can be ve toed by the pres i dent and the veto can be over rid den by a 2/3, i.e. 66.66%, su pra-ma jor ity of the mem bers pres ent in both cham bers of Con gress, also by dis cuss ing and ap prov ing it one af ter an other (ar ti cle 304 IMER B. FLORES 20 Else where I have pointed out that dif fer ent forms of leg is la tion, in clud ing the en acted prop erly by a leg is la tive as sem bly and a con sti tu tional amend ment or reform, have dif fer ent in sti tu tional forces and re quire ments. Vid. 72), whereas a Con sti tu tional Amend ment or Re form cannot be ve toed, since it has been al ready over ruled by the 2/3 re quire ment ex ante. 21 3) Leg is la tion it self, a Con sti tu tional Amend ment or Reform, and their fur ther ap pli ca tions by le gal of fi cials can be sub jected to ju di cial re view, but to have a gen eral (de rog atory) ef fect in some cases -as we al ready men tioned-a vote of at least 8 jus tices out of the 11, that con sti tute the Su preme Court at large, i. e. 72.72%, (or at least 4 out of the 5, that con sti tute each one of the two benches, i. e. 80%) is re quired (ar ti cle 105); 22 and 4) Leg is la tion and Con sti tu tional Amend ments or Reforms can be passed again and again un til the cri te ria identi fied by the Su preme Court are met.
VII. CONCLUSION
If I am cor rect/right, with my friendly amend ment, Waluchow will be back railed on track again with a Gen eral The ory of (Ju di cial Re view in a) Con sti tu tional De moc racy, but if I am in cor rect/wrong, I am merely an id iot ty ing myself to the mast and try ing to as sist some one else to tie him self to the mast. Any way, if we fol low Balkin sug ges tion: "We are all liv ing (tree) con sti tu tion al ists now. But only some of us are will ing to ad mit it". 23 
THE LIVING TREE
